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BOOK REVIEW
FELIX S. COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL
INDIAN LAW, 1982 EDITION
Charlottesville: Mitchie Bobbs-Merrill, 1982.
Pp. v, 912, $80.00.
Reviewed by Russel Lawrence Barsh*
I am led to believe that it will always be easy for a king to make the
lawyers the most useful instruments of his power.
-Alexis de Tocqueville l
Forty-one years ago, the legend goes, Harvard-educated Interior De-
partment Solicitor Felix Cohen brought order and light into what Justice
Frankfurter called the "mish-mash" of Indian affairs law. Cohen's work
was published by the government as a guide for Indian Bureau employ-
ees, but quickly assumed the role of an undisputed authority in litigation. 2
Lawyers read Cohen instead of the cases, and judges quoted or para-
phrased Cohen in their opinions. The treatise attracted almost biblical
reverence, a Prosser in a rather arcane sub-discipline.
It is in the nature of treatises to make a lawyer's task easier. Treatises
locate and summarize the case record, making it more accessible to the
unfamiliar, hasty, and inexperienced. Inherent in this is the tendency to
establish more or less authoritative interpretations in gray areas, steering
practitioners away from the disputed points that make new law. Treatises
jeopardize critical thinking when they reconcile what judges have said
and rationalize complexity into neat rules. This danger is greatest where
the intellectual turf is truly perplexing, the subject political, and the bench
and bar relatively unmotivated and ignorant. In such instances treatises
become more than scholarly summaries. They become the law.
* Associate Professor of Business, Government, and Society, University of Washington Gradu-
ate School of Business Administration; Member, Washington State Bar Ass'n; J.D., 1974, Harvard
University.
1. A. DE TOQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 265 (J. Mayer ed. 1969).
2. R. BARSH & J. HENDERSON, THE ROAD: INDIAN TRIBES AND POLITICAL LIBERTY 112-13
(1980).
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Felix Cohen was a man with a mission. He had a fervent confidence in
the watchdog role of law in democracy, and a faith that lawyers could
lead Indians out of political bondage. In his preface to the original edition
of the Handbook, he wrote that:
What has made this work possible, in the final analysis, is a set of beliefs
that form the intellectual equipment of a generation-a belief that our treat-
ment of the Indian in the past is not something of which a democracy can be
proud, a belief that the protection of minority rights and the substitution of
reason and agreement for force and dictation represent a contribution to civ-
ilization, a belief that confusion and ignorance in fields of law are allies of
despotism, a belief that it is the duty of the Government to aid oppressed
groups in the understanding and appreciation of their legal rights, a belief
that understanding of the law, in Indian fields as elsewhere, requires more
than textual exegesis, requires appreciation of history and understanding of
economic, political, social, and moral problems. 3
In short, Cohen belonged to that New Deal generation which believed
that reason and enlightened central planning could remake and improve
the social order. The law as he conceived it was an evolving instrument of
human progress which, like any tool, worked best if well understood and
properly used.
In this spirit Cohen injected something of his own humanistic views
into the Handbook, above and beyond what was to be found in the cases.
In the treatise's most frequently quoted passage, he admonished his read-
ers that:
Perhaps the most basic principle of all Indian law . . . is the principle that
those powers which are lawfully vested in an Indian tribe are not, in gen-
eral, delegated powers granted by express acts of Congress, but rather in-
herent powers of a limited sovereignty which has never been extinguished.
Each Indian tribe begins its relationship with the Federal Government as a
sovereign power, recognized as such in treaty and legislation. The powers
of sovereignty have been limited from time to time by special treaties and
laws designed to take from the Indian tribes control of matters which, in the
judgment of Congress, these tribes could no longer be safely permitted to
handle. The statutes of Congress, then, must be examined to determine the
limitations of tribal sovereignty rather than to determine its sources or its
positive content. What is not expressly limited remains within the domain of
tribal sovereignty. 4
The foundation of this relation, Cohen argued, was the "right of con-
quest" in the law of nations.
3. F. COHEN. HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW XViii (1941 ed.) [hereinafter cited as 1941
HANDBOOK].
4. Id. at 122.
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The whole course of judicial decision on the nature of Indian tribal pow-
ers is marked by adherence to three fundamental principles: (1) An Indian
tribe possesses, in the first instance, all the powers of any sovereign state.
(2) Conquest renders the tribe subject to the legislative power of the United
States and, in substance, terminates the external powers of sovereignty of
the tribe, e.g., its power to enter into treaties with foreign nations, but does
not by itself affect the internal sovereignty of the tribe, i.e., its powers of
local self-government. (3) These powers are subject to qualification by trea-
ties and by express legislation of Congress, but, save as thus expressly qual-
ified, full powers of internal sovereignty are vested in the Indian tribes and
in their duly constituted organs of government. 5
Although Cohen did not acknowledge the debt, this formula was a para-
phrase of Lord Mansfield's description of the political status of conquered
peoples in Campbell v. Hall6 two centuries earlier. Cohen employed an
obsolete imperial British doctrine to conceptualize a contemporary Amer-
ican situation.
Cohen's characterization of tribal authority as residual, rather than
delegated, was consistent with the Roosevelt Administration's plan for
re-recognizing and rebuilding tribal institutions, but proved embarrassing
in the Eisenhower era. It cut against the legitimacy of congressional en-
actments systematically "terminating" tribes and throwing them and
their lands on the states without Indian consent. The Handbook became a
political pawn. It was pointedly edited and reissued in 1958, carefully
bowdlerized to remove concessions to the sovereign sources of Indian
rights. When official national policy swung back to the New Deal posi-
tion in the late 1960's, it was time for a new Handbook. The new edition
predictably restores the conceptual framework of the 1941 original.
The problem is that much has happened in the world since 1941, and
the new edition seems unaware of it all. Before Pearl Harbor the United
States could pride itself as the paragon of human rights, and think its abo-
riginal policies the most enlightened in the world. But the Universal Dec-
laration of Human Rights, penned in large part by Eleanor Roosevelt and
proclaimed by the United Nations in 1948, 7 set in motion a new era of
international law. Judged by this evolving set of standards, U.S. Indian
5. Id. at 123 (footnotes omitted).
6. 98 Eng. Rep. 1045, 1047-48 (1774); see also Rex v. Vaughan, 98 Eng. Rep. 308 (1769)
(discussing political status of conquered peoples); Memorandum, 24 Eng. Rep. 646 (1722) (same);
Dutton v. Howell, I Eng. Rep. 17 (1693) (same). For a thorough discussion of conquest in imperial
British Law, see R. Barsh & J. Henderson, Aboriginal Rights, Treaty Rights, and Human Rights:
Indian Tribes and "Constitutional Renewal" (unpublished manuscript, to be published in J. CANA-
DIAN STUDIES).
7. G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc. A/777 (1948).
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administration is woefully archaic, a throwback to an earlier era in the
struggle for human dignity.
In the past few years American diplomats have been called increasingly
to account for apparent conflicts between U.S. Indian policy and United
Nations norms. Their characteristic reply has been silence, and that un-
fortunately is also the reply of the editors of the new Handbook. It con-
tains three references to "international law"-every one of them to the
customs and practices of the old European empires. U.S. legal traditions
described by the Handbook are indeed reasonably consistent with these
well-worn imperial doctrines, as the editors appear eager to demonstrate.
But this is like justifying a modem practice of hanging thieves in chains
because such was the usual punishment in 1650. The new Handbook
makes no reference to any principle of international law developed after
1800.
THE LEGITIMACY OF POWER
"Cohen was the Blackstone of American Indian law," the revision's
editors proclaim in their introduction. 8 "He brought organization and
conceptual clarity to the field."- 9 But Blackstone's opus became a con-
ceptual straightjacket once its novelty had passed, rooting nineteenth-cen-
tury English law in the morality and political dogma of the eighteenth
century. American lawyers in the first decades of the Republic fought a
bitter campaign to extirpate Blackstone from the literature because of its
great power to perpetuate implicitly monarchist thinking under the guise
of neutral common-law rules. Blackstone's erudite exposition of property
law, for example, was compelling and elegant, but entirely inappropriate
in a new nation that lacked a landed peerage and ancient manorial titles. ' 0
Like Blackstone's Commentaries, the Handbook may be destined to be
admired by scholars as an historical milestone, but quickly surpassed in
practice by more progressive thinking. Like the Commentaries, the
Handbook may be viewed by coming generations as more of an excuse
for the status quo of its time than a contribution to the growth of the living
law.
The heart of the revised edition's political theory is to be found in a
passage that closely tracks the 1941 original.
8. FELIX S. COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW Viii (1982 ed.) [hereinafter cited as
1982 HANDBOOK].
9. Id.
10. M. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1780-1860 at 44, 114-19, 162
(1977); P. MILLER, THE LIFE OF THE MIND IN AMERICA FROM THE REVOLUTION TO THE CIVIL WAR
223-30 (1965).
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Perhaps the most basic principle of all Indian law. . . is that those pow-
ers which are lawfully vested in an Indian tribe are not, in general, dele-
gated powers granted by expressed acts of Congress, but rather "inherent
powers of a limited sovereignty which has never been extinguished."...
The tribes began their relationship with the federal government with the
sovereign powers of independent nations. Upon coming under the authority
of the United States, a condition acknowledged in treaties and agreements
between tribes and the federal government, certain limitations upon the ex-
ternalpowers of tribal self-government necessarily followed. But the United
States from the beginning permitted, then protected, the tribes in their con-
tinued internal government. In so doing, the United States applied a general
principle of international law to the particular situation of the Indians. I I
This begs the fundamental political and moral issue: the legitimacy of
federal power to limit tribal sovereignty. The editors devote a chapter to
locating Indian affairs among the constitutionally enumerated powers of
the United States government, but this only addresses the allocation,
within the federal system, of whatever just authority over tribes the
United States possesses. How the nation as a whole acquired lawful
power over particular tribes in the first place is a question the editors care-
fully avoid, and one for which they have no convincing answer. Like
Cohen, they resort ultimately to aggression and Anglo-American superi-
ority to justify the political status quo, repeating his discussion of "con-
quest."12
The revised edition's editors purport to rely on "accepted political the-
ory and international law concerning dominance of weaker by stronger
nations," asserting that "a subject nation must yield to the overriding
legislative authority of the dominant nation and may depend upon the
stronger nation for protection, but it is otherwise independent."' 13 The
formation of "protectorates" or "dependencies" in eighteenth- and nine-
teenth-century law, however, was a matter of consent. It arose from free
association of the weaker with the stronger under treaties of protection or
guarantee. 14 It did not arise from nature or status.
11. 1982 HANDBOOK, supra note 8, at 231-32 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted). The itali-
cized portion indicates that limitations on tribal sovereignty are implied from the fact that the tribes
are under U.S. authority. See note 51 and accompanying text infra (discussing implied limitations on
sovereignty). This is a subtle change from Cohen's original language, which stated that tribal sover-
eignty is limited only by express treaties and legislation. See text accompanying note 4 supra.
12. Compare 1982 HANDBOOK, supra note 8, at 241-42 (revised edition's discussion of "con-
quest" principles) with 1941 HANDBOOK, supra note 3, at 123, reprinted in text accompanying note 5
supra (original edition's discussion of "conquest").
13. 1982 HANDBOOK, supra note 8, at 232.
14. H. WHaATON, ELEMENTs OF INTERNATIONAL LAW §§ 33-34 (1866), reprinted in CLAssiCS OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 44-45 (J. Scott ed. 1936).
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The editors concede that all Indian treaties did not expressly establish
such a relationship, but toss away this historical problem casually in a
footnote: "In 1831 the Supreme Court found that all Indian tribes are
dependent nations in regard to the United States, rendering such provi-
sions legally unnecessary." 15 They cite Cherokee Nation v. Georgia 16 for
this sweeping proposition but refer to no particular page at which it is to
be found. Nor could they, for the Supreme Court said no such thing.
Cherokee Nation dealt with an individual tribe which had, in fact, ex-
pressly accepted U.S. protection. Any doubt that the Cherokee treaty,
and not the Cherokees' race, was the source of the relationship was dis-
pelled by the Court in Worcester v. Georgia17 one year later.
By characterizing dependency as a concomitant of race rather than con-
sent, the revised Handbook perpetuates the most invidious conceit of
nineteenth-century European imperialism, that brown nations necessarily
and inevitably come under the suzerainty of white nations. Documents of
consent are immaterial; for their own good the poor savages are presumed
to consent. By invoking the "white man's burden" and "trusteeship" to
justify ignoring the requirement of specific consent in forming protector-
ates, late nineteenth-century British, French and German imperialists
briefly deviated from generally established norms, and this pretense has
been universally condemned by jurists and the United Nations for more
than thirty years. 18
CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL NORMS
According to the United Nations Charter, all "peoples" have the right
of "self-determination," and it is the duty of states administering non-
self-governing territories:
[T]o develop self-government, to take due account of the political aspira-
tions of the peoples, and to assist them in the progressive development of
their free political institutions, according to the particular circumstances of
each territory and its peoples and their varying stages of advancement. ' 9
The International Covenants on Human Rights,2 0 signed by President
15. 1982 HANDBOOK, supra note 8, at 65 n.37.
16. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17(1831).
17. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 546-47, 553-54 (1832).
18. The rise and fall of the "white man's burden" in international law since the 1880's is de-
tailed in R. Barsh, Indigenous North America and Contemporary International Law (unpublished
manuscript, to be published in OR. L. REV.).
19. U.N. CHARTER art. 73.
20. G.A. Res. 2200A, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 49 (1966).
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Carter in 1977,21 are multilateral United Nations treaties establishing uni-
versal, peremptory norms that supersede contrary provisions of domestic
law. 22 Each Covenant affirms that "[a]ll peoples have the right of self-
determination.. . . [They may] freely pursue their economic, social and
cultural development. . . . [They may,] for their own ends, freely dis-
pose of their natural wealth and resources. . . . In no case may a people
be deprived of its own means of subsistence.' '23 The same principles are
incorporated in the 1975 Helsinki Final Act, a multilateral human rights
treaty between NATO and Warsaw Pact nations signed by President
Ford.24
Options for the exercise of self-determination must include "(a)
[e]mergence as a sovereign independent State; (b) [f]ree association with
an independent State; or (c) [i]ntegration with an independent State," '25
and "the freely expressed wishes of the people concerned,', 26 ascertained
by "democratic" means, 27 are dispositive. Alien domination of non-self-
governing peoples is to be brought to a speedy and unconditional end;
"[i]nadequacy of political, economic, social or educational preparedness
should never serve as a pretext for delaying" peoples' free choice. 28 In
short, the Charter and interpretive resolutions have condemned "trustee-
ship" to the ash-heap of legal history. No state has a legal right to subject
another to "tutelage" on the excuse of the latter's helplessness or igno-
rance, and existing de facto guardianships are subject to immediate disso-
lution upon a determination of the administered people's own aspirations
for their future political status.
Territorial integrity and economic self-determination are points on
which federal decisions and international norms conflict most sharply. All
United States land titles ultimately rest on the doctrine of "discovery,"
i.e., that British exploration of the Atlantic coast established a British
(and, by succession, American) monopoly on the purchase of native
lands. 29 Originally the notion that this preemption right was a form of
actual present legal title-so called "naked" title subject to unextin-
guished native "occupancy" rights-was little more than a convenient
conceptual handle used to describe the coexisting interests of natives and
21. 13 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1488 (Oct. 5, 1977).
22. H. GROS ESPIELL, THE RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION: IMPLEMENTATION OF UNITED NATIONS
RESOLUTIONS 11-13 (1980).
23. G.A. Res. 2200A, 21 U.N. GAORSupp. (No. 16) at49 (1966).
24. Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe: Final Act, Aug. 1, 1975, § l(a)I, re-
printed in 73 STATE DEP'T BULL. 323,324 (September 1, 1975).
25. G.A. Res. 1541, 15 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 29 (1960).
26. U.N. CHARTER art. 76(b).
27. G.A. Res. 637,7 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 20) at 26 (1952).
28. G.A. Res. 1514, 15 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 67 (1960).
29 1982 HANDBOOK, supra note 8, at 487-89.
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colonists.30 By the end of the last century, however, "discovery" was
routinely identified as a source of congressional power to confiscate tribal
territories at pleasure. 31 Compensation was thus required under the fifth
amendment only if the particular tribe's "aboriginal" right to the soil had
been "recognized" by a treaty or other federal action prior to the confis-
cation. 32 The revised Handbook embraces these principles uncritically. 33
In the law of nations, the assertion of title through discovery and settle-
ment was justified under the rubric of terra nullius: it was just for the first
settler to claim "empty lands" claimed and held by no other. Indian and
other aboriginal lands were classified as "empty" by fiction-they were
legally empty because their inhabitants were not civilized. The whole
cant of terra nullius and discovery was rejected definitively by the Inter-
national Court of Justice in 1975 in a case of two United Nations Mem-
bers' conflicting claims to lands actually occupied by unorganized tribal
peoples. In that case, both litigants lost because the world court con-
cluded that neither had acquired the natives' prior rights by some accept-
able, bilateral means. 34
From an international standpoint, then, U.S. Indian law contravenes
peremptory international legal norms on at least three points: (1) tribes
have not been permitted to choose their political status by democratic
means; (2) tribes' exercise of self-government can be limited or abolished
unilaterally by Congress; and (3) tribal territory can be disposed of unila-
terally by Congress, even to the point of rendering tribes incapable of
subsisting without foreign aid. Both the original and revised editions of
Cohen's work emphasize the sui generis, as opposed to delegated, nature
of tribal sovereignty. If tribes do, in fact, derive their political character
from their original status as states and peoples, then Congress has no le-
gitimate authority to intervene in their affairs except as provided ex-
pressly by treaty. On the contrary, Congress has an affirmative duty to
afford tribes an opportunity to chart their own destiny. This is not a duty
of trusteeship or protection, but one of noninterference.
Against this background, the revised edition's conviction that U.S. In-
dian policy comports with international law is puzzling. "Plenary
power" cannot be reconciled with universal self-determination; it is a
nineteenth-century doctrine injected into a twentieth-century situation,
30. Barsh & Henderson, Contrary Jurisprudence: Tribal Interests in Navigable Waterways Be-
fore andAfter Montana v. United States, 56 WASH. L. REv. 627, 633-37 (1981).
31. Id. at 637-40; see also United States v. Santa Fe Pac. R.R., 314 U.S. 339, 347 (1941)
(discussing prior cases on discovery).
32. Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272. 288-89 (1955).
33. 1982 HANDBOOK, supra note 8, at 491.
34. Western Sahara, 1975 I.C.J. 6 (advisory opinion, May 22, 1975).
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and it flows from a discredited and antiquated morality. 35 Nor can the
editors of the revision justify their omission of United Nations law by
arguing that it has no place in municipal courts. A growing number of
American courts recognize international law as a rule for decision, espe-
cially where it is articulated in treaties of the United States and not ex-
pressly contradicted by subsequent federarlegislation. 36
THE NATURE OF TRUSTEESHIP
The editors of the revised Handbook struggle to reconcile "the inherent
tension between broad federal authority and specific federal trust obliga-
tions, ' ' 37 trimming some of the rough edges of contemporary United
States decisions and suggesting moderate limitations on congressional
discretion in this area. They contend that "plenary power" is not absolute
in the sense of being unlimited or unreviewable, but merely broader in
subject matter than the Constitution's enumeration of federal powers over
other citizens. Analogizing to the exclusive legislation clause and judicial
decisions according Congress extraordinarily broad police powers in the
territories and possessions under the property clause, they suggest that
there is nothing anomalous about the use of "plenary power" in our jur-
isprudence and that "trust responsibility" prevents its abuse. 38
The Handbook neglects to point out, however, that Americans emigrat-
ing to the District of Columbia or to the unorganized territories volun-
teered to live under such a regime; Indians did not. It was imposed upon
them by a course of judicial decisionmaking years after the tribes entered
into treaty relations with the United States,39 and often contradicted the
express terms of the treaties that were made. 40 Moreover, congressional
35. See generally A. SNOW, THE QUEV.ION OF ABORIGINES (1921) (discussing plenary power
doctrine).
36. E.g., Filartiga v. Pena-Ir-IL, o30 F.2d 876, 883-84 (2d Cir. 1980); Lareau v. Manson, 507
F. Supp. 1177, 1188 n.9 (D. Conn. 1980); Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 505 F. Supp. 787, 796-98 (D.
Kan. 1980), affd, 654 F.2d 1382, 1388 (10th Cir. 1981). But cf. Huynh Thi Anh v. Levi, 586 F.2d
625, 629-30 (6th Cir. 1978) (rejecting Geneva Convention and U.N. Articles as basis for private
right of action).
37. 1982 HANDBOOK, supra note 8, at 207.
38. Id. at 207, 217.
39. See Beecher v. Wetherby, 95 U.S. 517, 525 (1877); Cherokee Nation v. S. Kansas Ry., 135
U.S. 641, 657 (1890); Cherokee Nation v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 294, 308 (1902); Morrison v. Work,
266 U.S. 481,485 (1925).
40. Indian treaties contain many different formulations of the United States' acquired or dele-
gated powers. In the eighteen Pacific Northwest treaties, for example, sixteen tribes "acknowledge
themselves subject to the Government of the United States" and two "acknowledge their depen-
dence," but only four "engage to submit to and to observe all laws. . . which may be prescribed by
the United States." 2 C. KAPPLER, INDIAN AFFAIRS: LAWS AND TREATIEs 655, 657, 661, 665, 669,
674, 682, 694, 698, 702, 714, 719, 722, 764, 772, 776, 781, 785 (1904). On the plains, six tribes
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power over the territories has always been temporary in that it is limited
to the period preceding statehood. 41 In the case of the tribes, however, it
appears to be permanent and intractable.
42
Under recent Supreme Court rulings, congressional action must be tied
to a rational purpose to survive fifth amendment review.4 3 The Hand-
book's editors are forced to argue that this does not prevent Congress
from breaking treaties or from regulating Indians' lives in ways inimical
to their welfare. 44 Nonconfiscatory federal actions survive judicial scru-
tiny so long as they purport to implement United States obligations; the
courts will not look behind congressional judgments of what is best for
Indians. 45 The Handbook concludes that the rationality standard "does
not allow a reviewing court to second guess a particular determination by
Congress that a statute is an appropriate protection of the Indians' inter-
ests. Congressional discretion is necessarily broad in that respect. Nor
does [the rationality requirement] mean that Congress could never pass a
statute adverse to the best interests of the Indians."
46
What is left, then, of the limitations on "plenary power" that the edi-
tors rely upon to prevent oppression? Their discussion of "trust responsi-
bility" falls back in the end on administrative rather than legislative con-
duct, concluding that the executive branch must always act in good faith
agreed only to Congressional legislation "not inconsistent" with their treaties; four to "full power"
to legislate "for their welfare and best interest;" four to U.S. power to "prescribe and enforce...
rules and regulations;" two "acknowledge themselves to be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction and
authority of the United States;" and nine recognize federal power "to enforce such laws [as may] be
prescribed." Id. at 588,591,598,600,614, 618,628,631,634, 636,641. 790,796,800,807.883.
885, 887, 892, 896, 898, 899, 901, 903, 905, 906. A number of other plains tribes acknowledged
federal power to "pass such laws, on the subject of alienation and descent of property and on all
subjects connected with the government of the said Indians on said reservations, and the internal
police thereof, as may be thought proper"--but not to take their property without their consent. Id.
at 977. 984, 990, 998, 1008, 1012, 1015, 1020. A plenary-type federal power was therefore created.
in some instances, by treaty, with specified exceptions or limitations. These provisions were not
exacted from all treaty tribes, however, nor can they sensibly be applied to non-treaty tribes.
41. R. BARSH & J. HENDERSON, supra note 2, at 207-11.
42. See, e.g., St. Pierre v. Commissioner of Indian Affairs. 9 1.B.I.A. 203. 241-45 (1982). in
which the Board of Indian Appeals, an administrative tribunal of the Interior Department, ruled that
the United States cannot re-delegate tribal sovereignty or terminate its trusteeship, even if that is what
the tribe desires. Although this is not a decision of the high court, it is indicative of the political mood
in the government.
43. E.g., Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 555 (1974).
44. 1982 HANDBOOK, supra note 8, at 219, 221. See United States v. Antelope. 430 U.S. 641
(1977) (example of inimical treatment of Indians).
45. Delaware Tribal Business Committee v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73, 83-85 (1977). In United
States v. Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. 371 (1980), the Supreme Court ruled that the 1877 congressional
expropriation of the Black Hills was subject to fifth amendment review and just compensation. but in
Oglala Sioux Tribe v. United States, 650 F.2d 140 (8th Cir. 1981), cert. denied. 102 S. Ct. 1252
(1982), the tribe was barred from testing the substantive constitutionality of the expropriation in order
to have it nullified and set aside.
46. 1982 HANDBOOK, supra note 8, at 221.
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to "protect trust rights over conflicting public purposes except where spe-
cifically authorized to do otherwise by Congress." 47 If in doubt as to con-
gressional intent, the Administration is supposed to resolve legislative
conflicts in tribes' favor.
Even this modest limitation has been questioned by the Supreme Court
in a decision rendered shortly after the revised Handbook went to press.
In Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe,48 the majority held that Interior De-
partment officials may balance tribal interests with the interests of non-
members, and ensure that tribal actions are "consistent with national pol-
icies." ' 49 If this is where the Court is now headed, "trusteeship" is
meaningless except as an excuse for unbridled federal discretion at both
the legislative and executive levels.
Is it the role of a treatise to put bad law in the best possible light, or to
criticize it? The revision's editors take the first view. Their whole theory
of judicial limitations on federal Indian powers ultimately rests on a sin-
gle district court's ruling that federal officials must consult with Indians
and consider their interests before taking adverse action. 50 Perhaps the
Handbook will have sufficient credibility and authority to reverse the
trend set in motion by Merrion and make "trust responsibility" a real
safeguard. Unfortunately, however, the revised edition's persistent use of
trusteeship to explain the nature of federal powers over Indian tribes is
likely to entrench this notion even more, thus taking U.S. law further out
of line with international standards.
The editors of the revised edition missed another opportunity to take
the courts to task for unprincipled and ill-suited law. The Supreme
Court's 1978 decision on tribal criminal jurisdiction over nonmembers
revolutionized Indian law by finding limitations on tribal sovereignty
"necessarily implied" in tribes' "dependent status. '"51 Previously only
an express legislative enactment could divest a tribe of residual powers;
now the courts have been invited to look for divestitures concealed in the
very idea of being tribal and Indian.
Astonishingly, the revision speaks as if implicit divestiture has always
been part of Indian law, and includes it in its restatements of "basic prin-
47. Id. at 228.
48. 102S. Ct. 894(1982).
49. Id. at 903.
50. 1982 HANDBOOK, supra note 8, at 226-27 (citing Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe v. Morton, 354
F. Supp. 252 (D.D.C. 1972).
51. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 209 (1978). See also Barsh & Hender-
son, The Betrayal: Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe and the Hunting of the Snark, 63 MNN. L.
REv. 609 (1979) (discussing Oliphant); Collins, Implied Limitations on the Territorial Jurisdiction of
Indian Tribes, 54 WASH. L. REv. 479 (1979) (same).
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ciples" without acknowledging its relative novelty. 52 Implicit divestiture
endows federal judges with the same sweeping discretion to limit tribal
self-government that Congress has long enjoyed. The only practical way
to contain it is for Congress expressly to recognize or to delegate those
powers of tribal self-government threatened by judicial expurgation. It is
a racist doctrine both because it is based on the idea that Indians as a class
are inherently incapable or ill-suited to enjoy certain rights and because it
has only been applied to immunize non-Indians from the obligations of
tribal law.
"Plenary power" was a fairly novel idea in Felix Cohen's time, and
his original Handbook played a large role in establishing it. 53 His pleas
for congressional moderation and wisdom in its exercise, though, have
largely been ignored. What the 1941 Handbook did for "plenary power,"
the new edition promises to achieve for implicit divestiture of tribal pow-
ers. The 1982 edition also contains a plea for moderation, but, if the past
teaches us anything, courts will quote the revision liberally for the exis-
tence of this principle, and ignore the suggestion that it be invoked with
care.
CONCLUSION
The revised Handbook did not begin as an independent scholarly work.
Like the 1941 original, it was commissioned by the government and writ-
ten at public expense. Indeed, the revision of Cohen's work was so sensi-
tive that it took a special Act of Congress to initiate it54 and fourteen years
(and several staff turnovers) to complete it. 55 Given these extraordinary
circumstances, the bar has every right to expect an extraordinary book.
52. 1982 HANDBOOK, supra note 8, at 231-32, 244-45. As explained in Barsh & Henderson,
supra note 51, the Oliphant Court's derivation of implied divestiture from Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21
U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823), was erroneous.
53. The first articulation of "plenary power" by the courts appeared in Cherokee Nation v.
Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 294, 306 (1902). The only previous discussion of the doctrine in relation to
conquest and the scope of residual tribal sovereignty was in an Interior Department Solicitor's opin-
ion, 55 I.D. 14, 17 (1934), which was signed by Cohen's supervisor, Nathan Margold. and likely
penned by Cohen himself.
54. Act of Apr. 11, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, § 701(a)(2), 82 Stat. 73, 81 (codified at 25
U.S.C. § 1341(a)(2) (1976)).
55. An Indian Civil Rights Task Force was established in the Solicitor's Office, Department of
the Interior, in 1971 to carry out this task, but was disbanded in 1975. The University of New Mex-
ico's American Indian Law Center approached Interior in October, offering to complete the project
"outside the editorial control of the government" and without federal funds, in eighteen months. A
November 1975 contract gave the Center access to the Task Force's files, and assigned it the copy-
right with the understanding that the revision would be published and sold "at reasonable prices." In
May 1979 the Center advised Interior that it would need $58,700 in federal funds to complete the
work that year, since "neither the magnitude of the project nor the necessity for such meticulous
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In some respects it is. For lucidity and style it far surpasses the Cohen
volume-a remarkable achievement for a book written by committee. It
will no doubt find its way into the libraries of most practitioners in this
field, if for no other reason than for its comprehensive cumulation of the
case record in a readily accessible format. By comparison with the grow-
ing body of periodical literature on Indian law, however, the revision is
strikingly uncritical. Its review of recent federal legislation, for example,
is little more than a section-by-section skeleton-all dry bones and no
flesh. Controversies over these enactments' interpretation, implementa-
tion, and effects are scarcely acknowledged, and very little of the schol-
arly literature is even mentioned. This approach contrasts markedly with
the extensive bibliography provided by Cohen forty years ago.56 A
treatise need not take sides, but it should explore the issues.
While the editors of the revised Handbook may have viewed their con-
ceptual conservatism as faithfulness to the Cohen original, it in some re-
spects betrays Cohen's own aggressive vision of conceptual innovation as
a moral and political weapon in law. This is all the more tragic (and dan-
gerous) in a volume that has much to commend it to practitioners and is
likely to be around for many years to come. It is literate, thorough, and
speaks with the voice of enlightened modem authority-an awesome and
fascinating intellectual dinosaur.
editorial work was anticipated." Interior eventually contributed $88,000 to the revision which, com-
bined with private contributions, brought its total editorial cost to $271,000. Information provided
under the Freedom of Information Act to the Indian Law Resource Center, Washington, D.C., July
20, 1982 and August 19, 1982 (copy on file with the Washington Law Review).
56. 1941 HANDBOOK, supra note 3, at 638-43.
